Loksatta Article On the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of Kargil

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kargil war More than a war, it was an actual confrontation between two neonuclear powers that defied global norms and became nuclear-armed. While only five countries are recognized under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the ‘openness’ of nuclear testing by India and Pakistan is a monkey’s hand for the West! Once it takes the form of an actual conflict, all eyes are on what the two nuclear-armed nations will do and what steps the rest of the world and organizations like the United Nations will take to resolve the conflict.

The first question that arises is why the time has come for actual conflict? The then Pakistan Army Chief Pervez Musharraf decided to take control of the high hills in the Kargil area to take the hands of his military colleagues to get a decisive solution to the Kashmir issue. So that through this control of Srinagar-Leh highway can be isolated from Indian contact with Ladakh. A similar plan was implemented in the Banihal Pass area to separate the Kashmir Valley from Jammu and gain control. To a large extent, the theory now accepted is that the plan was hatched by Musharraf in complete disregard of the political leadership. But based on the information provided by the local herdsmen to the army, the infiltration came to light and the conflict started.

According to some analysts, Kargil was not a war but a conflict. This war, which took place on a limited scale within a certain area of ​​the actual border line, did not use even a tenth of the equipment of both countries and this conflict did not result in a major war. However, this moderate nature of conflict proved to be a diplomatic boon for India in the future. After the then Army Chief Ved Prakash Malik requested Prime Minister Vajpayee for Air Force assistance, the political leadership made the Air Force not to cross the Line of Control. India managed to dislodge the infiltrators by exercising utmost restraint as the infiltrators occupied strategic positions on the battlefield, despite the indignation of Pakistan violating the Lahore Accord signed between the two countries a few months ago. Unfortunately, even though more heroes were killed in this conflict than in the 1971 war, the Indian leadership was careful not to escalate the conflict without opening a second front. At the same time, India proved its strength by performing feats on the battlefield at a height of more than five thousand meters. After the end of the war, the then US President Bill Clinton praised this restraint during his visit to India and a new door was opened for India-US bilateral relations. Given its earlier history, Pakistan’s side was a decisive factor in bilateral relations. But after Kargil, a new chapter of trust began to be written in both the countries and in the coming years, the relationship with the new president gradually strengthened. And America became an important defense partner of India. After all, patience pays off in international politics!

A feature of this limited conflict is that it is becoming a common response in both countries in the form of surgical strikes. The 2019 Balakot airstrike was the first time India had crossed the border since 1971. The attack was planned in such a way that it would inflict nuclear damage on a neighboring country, using limited objectives, precise targets, and minimal material, but would not provoke an actual conflict. After Kargil, Pakistan responded to India’s policies of Operation Parakram and the Cold Start Doctrine (a policy of rapid deployment of troops along the border to respond to a possible nuclear attack by Pakistan) with the aim of developing strategic nuclear weapons. But now all these matters seem to have gone to waste and surgical strike has become the new strategy.

On the other hand, even as India-Pakistan bilateral relations were extremely strained, rounds of talks continued. Prior to the Kargil incident, the bilateral relations had improved tremendously with the Lahore Declaration in February, the start of the Delhi-Lahore bus service and the actual journey of Prime Minister Vajpayee through it. In October 1999, only a year and a half after Musharraf ousted Sharif, the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit took place in Agra. Many elements in Pakistan’s political-military sphere are keen on peace with India. So it appears that when a hopeful picture of peace emerges, disaster strikes. Kargil, Agra after February 1999, Parliament attack in December 2001, Manmohan Singh A series of terrorist attacks and the horrific 2008 coup saw a resurgence of cooperation under the government Mumbai Attack, in 2014 Narendra Modi The attack on the Uri army base in 2016, after the positives like the invitation to the swearing-in ceremony after coming to power, Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore on Sharif’s birthday, are all symbolic of this. Hence the utility of talks with Pakistan is debatable. According to some scholars, there is no transition without discussion. Because in the words of Vajpayee, ‘We can choose our friends, not our neighbours!’ But overall, post-Kargil, Pakistan’s cash flow has been seen on continuous small-scale bloodletting through terrorist attacks and infiltrations, rather than on actual conflict, rather than inflicting decisive wounds. As far as India is concerned, the army, which is trained for war, is losing its best soldiers and officers while responding to terrorist attacks. At such a time, Vajpayee’s discursive approach to conflict resolution shows the limits of moderation in politics. It may also be the political inevitability of Vajpayee, who runs a 23-party government, riddled with economic essays.

At the government level, the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee Report (2000) and the Ministerial Group Report (2001) were instrumental in Indian military reforms. The report was instrumental in reviving arms procurement that had languished after the Bofors affair. Also creation of the post of Chief of Defense Force (CDS) to lead the three forces, efforts for jointness, integration and threatisation of the armed forces, emphasis on reducing the age of soldiers through the Agniveer Yojana, emphasis on adoption of latest technology and shedding the burden of Cold War. By keeping, adopting a pragmatist approach, international partnerships etc. are the results of the above reports.

As the limited war strategy deepens, the threat of a conventional war with Pakistan has not gone away. Terrorists are shedding blood in Kashmir. The recent shift in violence from Kashmir to Jammu is a sign of changed tactics across the border. At the same time, during the 25 years between 1999 and 2024, weak, unaccountable democracy has been the hallmark of Pakistan’s political system. This lack of accountability, combined with the centralization of military-political power, cannot be ruled out as a challenge to the leadership. At such a time, it is important to realize that Kargil was only a successful defeat, not a defeat of the anti-Indian forces across the border. After 25 years, the question is not the same, but even more complex. An end to the bitterness between the two countries is necessary for peace. In the words of Vajpayee, let us ask Pakistan once again,

You come from Gulshan-e-Lahore to Chaman Bar Dosh,

We came in the morning with the light of Banaras,

Then after that ask who is the enemy.

(You bring fragrance from the gardens of Lahore, I will bring the dawn of Banaras. And then let us ask, who is the enemy?)

Phanasepankaj @gmail.com